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During the last decade, there has been a drastic intensiﬁcation of the war against cocaine
production and traﬃcking, not only in Latin-American producer countries but, also, in
some of the main consumer countries such as the United States. For instance, in Colombia,
where about 70% of the cocaine consumed in the world is produced, during the last 7
years the U.S. and the Colombian governments have allocated huge amounts of resources
to combat production and traﬃcking under the so-called Plan Colombia.1 According to the
Colombian National Planning Department (DNP, 2006), between 2000 and 200, the U.S.
government has spent about $3.8 billion dollars in subsidies to the Colombian government
for its war against illegal drug producers and traﬃckers. Colombia for its part has spent
about $6.9 billion during the same period. About half of the Colombian expenses (about
$3.4 billion) and about three-quarters of the U.S. subsidies (about $2.8 billion) have gone
directly to ﬁnance the military component of the war against drug production, traﬃcking,
and the organized criminal organizations associated with these activities (DNP, 2006, Table
2). Nevertheless, most available measures show that the availability of cocaine in consumer
countries has not gone down signiﬁcantly, nor has the price of cocaine shown any tendency
to increase, as one might have expected given the intensiﬁcation of the war on drugs (see
Mejía and Posada, 2008). While the number of hectares of coca crops cultivated in Colombia
has decreased from about 163.000 in 2000 to about 80.000 in 2006 - as a result of the intense
aerial eradication campaigns- potential cocaine production in Colombia has only decreased
from 695,000 kilograms per year in 2000 (right before the initiation of Plan Colombia)t o
roughly 610,000 kgs per year in 2006 (see UNODC, 2007).2 Consistent with the observed
data just described on potential cocaine production and the relatively stable ﬁgures for
consumption trends, the price of cocaine at the wholesale and retail levels in consumer
countries has shown a relatively stable trend since 2000.3
1Plan Colombia is the oﬃcial name of a program that, among other things, provides the institutional
framework for an strategic alliance between the Colombian and United States’ governments to ﬁght against
the production and traﬃcking of illegal drugs (mainly cocaine), as well as the organized criminal organi-
zations associated with these activities.
2During the same period, coca cultivation and cocaine production has increased slightly in the other two
major producer countries, Bolivia and Peru. As a result, the total ﬁgures for potential cocaine production
have remained relatively constant for the last 6-7 years (see UNODC, 2007; and Mejia and Posada, 2008).
3The wholesale and retail price of cocaine decreased rapidly between 1990 and 2000, but since then has
remained relatively stable. See Costa-Storti and De Grauwe (2007) for an explanation of this phenomenon
2In the U.S., where about half of the cocaine produced in the world is consumed, the
Federal Government currently spends about $12.5 billion per year on diﬀerent dimensions
of the war on drugs. Approximately $7.7 billion (about 60%) is spent on policies aimed
at reducing the supply of illegal drugs, such as domestic law enforcement, interdiction,
and subsidies to drug producer countries; the other $4.8 billion (about 40%) is spent on
policies aimed at reducing the demand for drugs, among them prevention campaigns and
the treatment of drug addicts (see ONDCP, 2007, Table 1).
This paper develops a simple model of the war against illegal drugs in producer and con-
sumer countries, where there are strategic interaction between the actors involved. These
are the illegal drug producer and traﬃcker, the government of the drug producer country,
the government of the drug consumer country, and a wholesale drug dealer in the border
of the consumer country. We explicitly model the (wholesale) illegal drug market, which
allows us to account for feedback eﬀects between anti-drug policies and market outcomes
(quantities and prices) likely to arise as a consequence of such large scale policy interven-
tions as Plan Colombia.
In the producer country, the government comes into conﬂict with the drug producer
and traﬃcker over the fraction of illegal drugs successfully produced and exported to the
consumer country. In modelling the conﬂict between the government and the drug producer
and traﬃcker, we abstract from explicitly modelling the conﬂict over the control of arable
land necessary for the cultivation of illicit crops.4
Following the analysis of Grossman and Mejía (2008), we assume that the government
of the drug consumer country uses both a stick and a carrot to strengthen the resolve of
the government of the drug producer country in its war against illegal drugs. Additionally,
the government of the drug consumer country uses prevention policies and subsidies to
the government of the drug producer country in an attempt to minimize the amount of
illegal drugs transacted in the market. While the former are aimed at reducing the demand
for drugs through educational campaigns and by providing treatment to drug addicts, the
latter are aimed at reducing the supply of illegal drugs coming from the drug producer
country. Importantly, we study how anti-drug policies implemented in consumer and pro-
ducer countries interact and aﬀect one another’s eﬀectiveness. Our analysis shows how the
based on the increased globalization of the illegal drug markets.
4See Grossman and Mejia (2008), and Mejia and Restrepo (2008) for models in which this particular
front of the war on drugs is explicitly studied.
3equilibrium allocation of resources between these two alternative policies crucially depends
on the price elasticity of the demand for illegal drugs in the consumer country, on the eﬀec-
tiveness of prevention and treatment policies in reducing the demand for illegal drugs, and
on the eﬀectiveness of anti-drug policies in the producer country. In particular, we show
how the relative allocation of resources to subsidies for the war on drugs in producer coun-
tries should be smaller when the following conditions exist: the demand for illegal drugs is
relatively inelastic; prevention and treatment policies are relatively more eﬀective; and the
anti-drug policies being implemented in producer countries are relatively less eﬀective.
We calibrate the model using the available data on the market for cocaine as well as
data on the war against cocaine production, traﬃcking, and consumption in Colombia
and the U.S. This calibration exercise allows us to recover some important unobservable
parameters, such as the price elasticity of the demand for cocaine, the relative eﬀectiveness
of interdiction eﬀorts, and the eﬀectiveness of prevention policies in reducing the demand
for cocaine.
One of the main contributions of this paper is that it provides a formal analytical
framework for understanding the interactions between anti-drug policies implemented in
producer and consumer countries. Importantly, by explicitly modelling the illegal drug
market, we are able to account for the feedback eﬀects between policies and market out-
comes that are likely to arise as a result of large scale policy interventions such as those
implemented under the war on drugs in producer and consumer countries. While there have
been some important attempts at developing models of the war on drugs in both producer
countries (Grossman and Mejía, 2008; and Mejía and Restrepo, 2008) and consumer coun-
tries (Becker, Grossman and Murphy, 2006; Rydell et al., 1996; and Caulkins, 1993, among
others) there is no model in the literature that studies the interaction between anti-drug
policies implemented in both consumer and producer countries. An important exception
are the recent contributions by Chumacero (2006) and Costa-Storti and De Grauwe (2008).
Chumacero (2008) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of the war against illegal
crops cultivation on the one hand, and that against illegal drug production, traﬃcking
and consumption, on the other.5 H i sm a i nc o n t r i b u t i o nr e l i e so nt h ec a l i b r a t i o no fs o m e
key parameters of the model that are then used to assess the eﬀects of three alternative
5The title of his paper, “Evo, Pablo, Tony, Diego, and Sonny”, is quite suggestive of the fact that in it
he studies the war on drugs at almost all stages: illegal crop cultivation (Evo), drug production (Pablo),
drug traﬃcking (Tony), and drug consumption (Diego).
4policies - making illegal activities riskier, increasing the penalties for illegal activities, and
legalization. Costa-Storti and De Grauwe (2008) address the issue of how globalization
has reduced the retail price of illegal drugs during the last few decades, thus stimulating
consumption.
The paper includes four sections, where this introduction is the ﬁrst one. The second
section, which constitutes the core of the paper, develops the model and explains the
motivations and choices of the actors involved in the war on drugs. This section also derives
the equilibrium of the model. Section three presents the results of the calibration of the
model using the available data on the cocaine market, some key ﬁgures on the war against
cocaine production and traﬃcking in Colombia, and data on the allocation of resources for
prevention and treatment policies in the U.S. The fourth section concludes.
2. The Model
We model the war against illegal drugs as a sequential game. In the ﬁrst stage of the
game, the government of the drug consumer country chooses the optimal allocation of
resources between prevention and treatment policies and enforcement policies. The latter
take the form of a subsidy to the government of the drug producer country in order to
strengthen its resolve in the war against illegal drug production and traﬃcking. Both sets
o fp o l i c i e sh a v et h es a m eo b j e c t i v e ,n a m e l yt or e d u c et h ea m o u n to fi l l e g a ld r u g st r a n s a c t e d
in the consumer country at the wholesale level. While prevention and treatment policies
target the reduction of demand, enforcement policies (subsidies to the producer country’s
government) aim at thwarting the availability of drugs in the consumer country - that is,
at reducing the supply of illegal drugs. In the second stage of the game, the government of
the drug producer country comes into conﬂict with drug producers and traﬃckers over the
fraction of illegal drugs successfully exported.
We start with the second stage of the game, that is, with the conﬂict between the drug
producer country’s government and the illegal drug producer and traﬃcker over the fraction
of illegal drugs successfully produced and exported.
52.1. The drug traﬃcking game
2.1.1. The interdiction technology
Let q be the fraction of drugs that survive the government’s interdiction eﬀorts. The






where r is the amount of resources that the government invests in the interdiction of
drug shipments, such as radars, airplanes, go-fast boats, etc.; s i st h ea m o u n to fr e s o u r c e s
that the drug traﬃcker invests in trying to avoid the interdiction of drug shipments, such
as submarines, go-fast boats, airplanes, etc.; and φ>0 is a parameter that captures the
relative eﬀectiveness of the resources invested by the government in trying to interdict
illegal drug shipments. Note that the fraction, q, of illegal drugs that the drug traﬃcker




2.1.2. The drug traﬃcker
The problem of the drug producer and traﬃcker is to choose the amount of resources to
invest in trying to avoid the interdiction of drug shipments in order to maximize proﬁts,
πT. More precisely, the drug traﬃcker’s problem is given by:
max
{s}
πT = pcqλL− s. (2)
The ﬁrst term in equation 2 is the price of drugs at the border of the consumer country,
pc, times the fraction of drugs that survives interdiction eﬀorts, q, times the amount of drugs
produced in the consumer country, λL. This last term is the product of the productivity
per hectare of land per year, λ (for instance, the number of kilograms of illegal drugs that
c a nb ep r o d u c e dt h r o u g ht h ec u l t i v a t i o no ft h ei l l e g a lc r o po no n eh e c t a r eo fl a n di no n e
6A contest success function (CSF) is “a technology whereby some or all contenders for resources incur
costs in an attempt to weaken or disable competitors” (Hirshleifer, 1991). In this particular case, the
CSF determines the fraction of illegal drugs that are succesfully exported to the consumer country as a
function of the government’s interdiction eﬀorts and the drug traﬃcker’s eﬀorts to avoid the government’s
interdiction of drug shipments. See Skaperdas (1996) and Hirshleifer (2001) for a detailed explanation of
the diﬀerent functional forms of CSFs.
6year7), times the number of hectares of land under the drug producer’s control, L.8 The
last term, s, denotes the amount of resources invested by the drug traﬃcker in trying to
avoid the interdiction of illegal drug shipments.9





(s + φr)2pdλL =1 . (3)
Equation 3 describes the best reaction function of the drug traﬃcker to every possible
choice of resources employed by the government in its interdiction eﬀorts, r.
2.1.3. The government of the drug producer country
Following Grossman and Mejía (2008), we assume that the drug consumer country’s gov-
ernment uses both a stick and a carrot in an attempt to strengthen the resolve of the drug
producer country’s government in its war against illegal drugs. The stick is the threat that
the interested outsider will label the country as a narco-state and, as a result, it will be
ostracized by the international community.
Let us assume that, from the perspective of the drug producer country’s government, the
decision of the drug consumer country to apply the label narco-state includes a stochastic
element.10 To allow for this stochastic element, we assume that the drug producer country’s
7In the case of Colombian cocaine, this yield/hectare/year ratio was, for 2006, about 7.4 kg of cocaine
per hectare (see UNODC, 2006).
8See Grossman and Mejia (2008), and Mejia and Restrepo (2008) for models that include conﬂicts
between the government and drug producers over the control of arable land suitable for cultivating illegal
crops.
9Equation 2 implicitly assumes that the cost of producing illegal drugs is zero. In reality, the main
costs of illegal drug production and traﬃcking are those associated with avoiding the eradication of illegal
crops and the interdiction of drug shipments; the cost of actually producing illegal drugs is negligible. This
assumption is made for analytical simplicity, and does not modify the main results obtained below.
10What we have in mind is the Drug Certiﬁcation Process, which was established in 1986 and whereby,
each year, the U.S. government evaluates the level of cooperation and meassures taken by all illegal drug
producer and transit countries against illegal drug production and traﬃcking. Those countries that are
not certiﬁed face a number of consequences with direct and indirect costs. For instance, non-certiﬁcation
“requires the U.S. to deny sales or ﬁnancing under the Arms Export Control Act; deny non-food assistance
under Public Law 480; deny ﬁnancing by the Export-Import Bank, and withhold most assistance under
the FAA with the exception of speciﬁed humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance. The U.S. must
also vote against proposed loans from six multilateral development banks.” see: http://www.usembassy-
7government perceives the probability of its being labeled a narco-state to be equal to the
ratio D/λL, where λL is the amount of drugs that could potentially be produced and
exported annually, and D = qλL is the actual production and exportation of illegal drugs.
Let c denote the annual cost in dollars that the drug producer country’s government
anticipates would result from being labeled a narco-state. Thus, the expected annual cost
associated with the possibility of being labeled a narco-state equals the product of c and
q (D/λL = q).
The carrot employed by the drug consumer country is a subsidy to the drug producer
country’s armed forces. This subsidy is a fraction, 1 − ω, of the resources that the drug
producer country allocates to the interdiction of drug shipments, r.
The objective of the drug producer country’s government is to minimize the sum of
the costs associated with illegal drug production and traﬃcking. These costs are given by
the sum of the expected cost of being labeled a narco-state and the cost of ﬁghting the
war against drug production and traﬃcking. This cost is given by the amount of resources
invested by the government in interdiction eﬀorts, r, times the fraction actually paid by
the government, ω. Thus, the problem for the government of the drug producer country is:
min
{r}
CT = cq + ωr, (4)
where q is determined by equation 1.





(s + φr)2c + ω =0 . (5)
Equation 5 is the government’s best reaction function to every possible choice of re-
sources employed by the drug traﬃcker in avoiding the interdiction of illegal drug ship-
ments, s.
2.2. The drug traﬃcking equilibrium






the drug traﬃcking game is in equilibrium.11
mexico.gov/bbf/bfdossier_certDrogas.htm.
11Recall that r, s, and pc are endogenous variables of the model.





that satisfy the following expression







According to the expression for the GE LOCUS, a higher price for the illegal drug
in the consumer country leads to lower relative spending by the drug producer country’s
government on the war on drugs. This is so because a larger pc increases the marginal
returns for the drug traﬃcker of allocating resources to avoiding interdiction; this naturally
induces the traﬃcker to ﬁght relatively harder than the government.12
Using the expression in equation 6, and inserting it into the drug traﬃcker’s reaction
function (equation 3), we can derive an explicit expression for the government’s and the
drug traﬃcker’s level of expenses in the war on drugs (both as functions of the parameters
of the model and the price of drugs in the consumer country, yet to be determined). These
two allocations are given, respectively, by:
r =
φc2(λLωpc)2







In turn, if we insert r and s from equations 7 and 8 into equation 1, the fraction of
illegal drugs that survives the government’s interdiction eﬀorts in equilibrium (that is, the





The fraction of drugs that survives the government’s interdiction eﬀorts is an increasing
and concave function of the price of drugs; of the fraction of the expenses in interdiction
eﬀorts paid by the drug producer country’s government, ω; and of potential cocaine produc-
tion, λL. A higher relative eﬃciency in the government’s interdiction of drug shipments, φ,
12This result arises from the assumption that the cost to the drug producer country’s government from
illegal drug production and traﬃcking does not depend on the price of drugs, but on the drugs succesfully
produced and exported relative to potential production.
9or a larger cost of being labeled a narco-state, c, decreases the fraction of drugs successfully
exported.
We now turn to a description of the drug market equilibrium.
2.3. The drug market equilibrium
First, let us assume that the demand for drugs at the border of the consumer country is









c denotes the demand for drugs by drug dealers at the border of the consumer
country, and a(l) ≥ 0,w i t hl denoting the allocation of resources to prevention policies
(educational campaigns, treatment programs for drug addicts, etc.) aimed at reducing the
demand for illegal drugs in the consumer country. Naturally, we assume that a0(l) < 0 -
that is, as more resources are allocated to prevention and treatment policies, the demand
for illegal drugs decreases (i.e., the demand for drugs shifts to the left). pc is the price of
illegal drugs at the border of the consumer country, and b is the price elasticity of demand
for illegal drugs at the wholesale level at the border of the consumer country.







According to equation 11, the supply of drugs in the consumer country is equal potential
drug production, λL, multiplied by the fraction of the production not interdicted, q (see
equation 1). Note that equation 11 expresses the supply of drugs in the consumer country
as a function of the ratio of expenses in the war on drugs in the producer country, r/s.
In the drug market equilibrium, we must have that Qd
c = Qs
c. Equating 10 and 11 and






the illegal drug market at the border of the consumer country is in equilibrium.





that satisfy the following expression











10In contrast with the GE Locus, under the ME Locus, a higher price of illegal drugs at
the border of the consumer country leads to a larger relative spending by the government of
the drug producer country in the war on drugs. This positive relationship between the ratio
of spendings in the war on drugs and the price of the illegal drug in the consumer country
arises because a higher ratio
r
s
means a lower supply of drugs and, given the demand,
the price of the illegal drug, pc, has to increase in order for the drug market to remain in
equilibrium.
We can now use both LOCI described above to graphically represent the equilibrium




for which the drug traﬃcking game is in equilibrium, while the ME Locus describes





for which the drug market is in equilibrium. The two LOCI are
represented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The GE and ME LOCI.
We can now study how changes in the parameters of the model shift each of the two
LOCI, and how the relative allocation of resources to the war on drugs and the price of illegal
drugs change as some of the structural parameters of the model change. At this point, we
will focus on changes in the allocation of resources with respect to prevention and treatment
policies, and enforcement policies in the form of subsidies to the drug producer country’s
11government (which will be the focus of our analysis once we turn to the analysis of the ﬁrst
stage of the game). Figure 2 shows how the price of illegal drugs and the relative spending
on the war on drugs change as l increases (i.e., as a decreases). Figure 3 shows the eﬀect
of a decrease in ω (an increase in the subsidy to the drug producer country’s armed forces
in its war against illegal drug production and traﬃcking). While an increase in spending
on prevention policies aimed at reducing consumption in the consumer country reduces
the equilibrium price of drugs and increases the government’s relative spending on the
war on drugs (thereby reducing the equilibrium fraction of drugs successfully exported),
an increase in the subsidy increases the equilibrium price of drugs at the border of the
consumer country and the government’s relative spending on the war on drugs. Note that
an increase in the subsidy generates two opposing forces on the ratio r/s -i ti n c r e a s e st h e
price of illegal drugs, and thus increases the incentives for the drug traﬃckers to invest
resources in evading interdiction (as the price of drugs increases); and it increases the
incentives for the drug producer country’s government to invest resources on the war on
drugs, as the marginal cost of doing so goes down. The net eﬀe c ti sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h er a t i o
r/s (as shown in Figure 3). Importantly, an increase in the subsidy from the drug consumer
country induces an increase in the total resources invested on the war on drugs, r + s -
that is, an increase in the subsidy to the drug producer country’s government increases the
intensity of the conﬂict as measured by the sum of resources invested by the two actors
involved in this war.
12Figure 2: The eﬀects of an increase in l (decrease in a).
Figure 3: The eﬀects of an increase in the subsidy (decrease in ω).
The representation of the equilibrium of the model in terms of the two LOCI described
above is helpful for understanding how changes in the parameters of the model aﬀect the
relative allocation of resources to the war on drugs and, correspondingly, the fraction of
drugs successfully exported. However, the equilibrium of the model can also be represented
13using a standard supply and demand framework. Using equation 9, the supply of drugs









In turn, the demand for drugs is given by equation 10. The graphical representation of
the equilibrium at this stage of the game in a simple supply and demand ﬁgure is depicted
in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Drug market equilibrium: First stage.
Solving for pc in both expressions and making Qs
c = Qd
c = Qc, the equilibrium quantity
of drugs is determined by the following implicit equation, which depends on the parame-
ters of the model as well as on the two choice variables for the drug consumer country’s




c φc + a(l)
1
bλLω(Qc − λL)=0 . (14)
Using the expression for the equilibrium quantity of drugs in the second stage of the
game, we are now able to determine the sign of the eﬀect of changes in the parameters of
14the model on the equilibrium quantity of drugs. The following are the main comparative







≤ 0. An increase in prevention policies aimed at reducing the demand
for drugs in the drug consumer country decreases the amount of illegal drugs transacted in
equilibrium. On the one hand, ∂F/∂Qc > 0, and, on the other hand, ∂F/∂l > 0 because
Qc−λL < 0. Recall that λL is potential drug production whereas Qc is the amount of drugs
transacted in equilibrium. With at least some interdiction (that is, with q<1,a si si nf a c t
the case in equilibrium (see equation 9)), the amount of drugs transacted in equilibrium is
always lower than potential drug production. Conversely, a decrease in l (i.e., an increase
in a) increases the amount of illegal drugs transacted. We elaborate more on this point
in the next section of the paper, when we consider the optimal allocation of resources to







≥ 0. A decrease in the subsidy to the drug producer country in
its war against illegal drugs (that is, a lower 1 − ω) increases the quantity of illegal drugs
transacted in equilibrium. Again, this result follows from the fact that Qc − λL < 0.
Intuitively, a larger marginal cost for the interdiction eﬀorts of the drug producer country’s
government will induce it to spend less resources on the interdiction of drug shipments. As
a result, the supply of drugs in the consumer country (net of interdiction) will increase.













≤ 0. An increase in either the relative
eﬃciency of the drug producer country’s government in the war on drugs or an increase in
the cost to the drug producer country of being labeled a narco-state leads to a negative
shift in the supply of drugs. This is because the drug producer country’s government will
allocate relatively more resources to its interdiction eﬀorts. As a result, the equilibrium













≥ 0. An increase in λ, the productivity
per hectare of land used for the cultivation of illegal crops, or an increase in L,t h el a n d
under the control of drug producers, increases the amount of drugs produced and exported
in equilibrium. An increase in productivity or in the amount of land controlled by drug
15producers shifts the supply curve outwards. As a result, the price of drugs goes down and
the quantity of drugs in equilibrium goes up.
We now turn to an analysis of the ﬁrst stage of the game - that is, the stage at which
a choice is made between prevention policies and policies aimed at curtailing the supply of
drugs by increasing subsidies for the drug producer country’s interdiction eﬀorts.
2.4. Anti-drug policies in the consumer country: prevention and treatment ver-
sus enforcement
During the ﬁrst stage of the game, the objective of the drug consumer country’s government
is to minimize the amount of illegal drugs transacted at its border. To achieve this objec-
tive, the drug consumer country’s government combines prevention and treatment policies,
aimed at reducing the demand for illegal drugs, and enforcement policies in the form of
subsidies to the armed forces of the drug producer country in its war against illegal drug
production and traﬃcking.
More formally, the objective of the drug consumer country’s government is:
min
{l,d}
Qc subject to : (15)
l + d = M, and
d =( 1 − ω)r
∗,
where Qc is the quantity of illegal drugs transacted at the border of the consumer country
in equilibrium, M is the consumer country’s total budget for prevention and enforcement
policies, l is the allocation of resources to prevention policies (i.e. the reduction of demand),
and d is the total amount of resources that the drug consumer country grants to the drug
producer country in the form of subsidies to ﬁnance its expenses in its war against illegal
drug traﬃcking. The total amount of subsidies, d, is equal to the marginal subsidy, 1 −ω,
times the resources spent by the drug producer country on the war against drug production
and traﬃcking, r∗ -t h a ti s ,d is the total amount of resources allocated by the drug consumer
country’s government to reducing the supply of illegal drugs coming from the drug producer
country.
Using equations 7 and 13, and the fact that d =( 1− ω)r∗, we can solve for ω in terms
of the parameters of the model, the amount in subsidies provided by the drug consumer

















Replacing the expression for ω obtained in equation 16 into equation 14 allows us to
express the quantity of drugs transacted in equilibrium (that is the equilibrium level of Qc)
as a function of the parameters of the model and the two instruments of the drug consumer





















¶(Qc − λL)=0 . (17)
Using the implicit function in equation 17 - which determines the equilibrium quantity
of illegal drugs as a function of the two instruments of the drug consumer country’s gov-
ernment - the optimal allocation of resources between prevention and enforcement policies







Intuitively, the optimally condition in equation 18 states that the drug consumer coun-
try’s government will adjust the allocation of resources between prevention and deterrence
policies until the two are equally eﬀective at the margin in reducing Qc.
Deriving the expressions for ∂S(.)/∂l and ∂S(.)/∂d from equation 17, the optimality















In order to ﬁnd a close form solution to the problem of the drug consumer country’s
government, let us assume that:










where A>0, and θ>0 is a parameter that captures the eﬃciency of prevention policies.
More precisely, parameter θ captures the percentage of reduction in the demand for drugs
as a result of a 1% increase in spending on treatment and prevention policies.
















Finally, using the budget constraint of the drug consumer country’s government together
with equation 21, the optimal allocation of resources between treatment and prevention
policies on the one hand, and subsidies to the drug producer country’s government on the
































A few things in equations 22 and 23 are worth noticing. First, if the demand for drugs
becomes more inelastic (i.e., if b is lower), the optimal allocation of resources shifts towards
prevention policies and away from enforcement policies. This result is in line with that
of Becker et al. (2006).14 Second, a higher θ -t h a ti s ,ah i g h e re ﬃciency for treatment
and prevention policies in reducing the demand for illegal drugs - increases the optimal
allocation of resources to prevention policies and decreases that to enforcement policies.
Replacing the optimal allocation d∗ from equation 23 into equation 24, which describes
the equilibrium value of ω, we get:
14As u ﬃcient condition for this result to be true is that Qc/(λL) < 1/2. However, even if this condition
does not hold, the result might still hold for a broad range of parameter values. The details of this





















Replacing the optimal allocation of resources to prevention policies, l∗, from equation
















Finally, replacing equations 24 and 25 into equation 14, the equilibrium level of illegal
drugs transacted in equilibrium is described by the following implicit equation (this time
















































3. Calibration strategy and results
In this section, we use data from the market for cocaine at the wholesale level, as well as
available data on the outcomes of Plan Colombia, in order to calibrate the unobservable
parameters of the model.
Table 1 brieﬂy describes some of the data used in calibrating the parameters of the
model.15 All the data that we use is for 2006, though the data on the Colombian and
U.S. allocation of resources for the war on drugs under Plan Colombia is not available on
a yearly basis, but as average allocations during the Plan Colombia’s duration. We don’t
have a direct estimate for the U.S. allocation of resources on prevention and treatment
policies, l, in reducing the demand for cocaine. However, we do know the total amount
of resources spent by the U.S. government on policies aimed at reducing the demand for
15For a thorough description of the data on the market for cocaine, the war on drugs, etc., see Mejia and
Posada (2008).
19illegal drugs - about $3,8 billion in 2006 (see ONDCP, 2007). We assume that about 7%
of these resources (or about $250 million) are spent on reducing cocaine consumption.
Table 1
Definition Variable Observed Source
Drug seizures (kgs) (1 − q)λL 98,000 UNODC, 2007
C o c a i n ep r i c e / k ga tt h eU . S .b o r d e r( $ / k g ) pc 32,500 UNODC, 2007
Colombian cocaine in the wholesale market Qc 531,000 UNODC, 2007
US budget for prevention ($) l 250 million ONDCP, 2007
US budget for Plan Colombia ($) d 465 million DNP, 2006
Hectares of land with coca crops (has) L 85.000 UNODC, 2007
Kilos of cocaine/hectare/year (kgs) λ 7,4 UNODC, 2007
Colombian expenditures on the war on drugs ωr 561,6 million DNP, 2006
Using equations 7, 9, 20, 22, 24, and 26 together, we can jointly calibrate b, θ,φ,ω, A,







A 4.9 x 108
c $3.8 billion
The estimated value for the price elasticity of demand for cocaine, 0.66, denotes a
relatively inelastic demand. In some ways, this result reaﬃrms the view that the demand
for hard drugs is relatively inelastic. This estimate for the price elasticity of demand at the
wholesale level is very close to that found by Mejía and Restrepo (2008), about 0.67.
θ, a parameter that captures the eﬃciency of prevention policies in reducing the demand
for cocaine in the U.S., is estimated to be about 0.171. This parameter can be interpreted
as the percentage of reduction in the demand for cocaine at the wholesale level resulting
after a 1% increase in the resources devoted to prevention and treatment policies. That is,
20a 1% increase in prevention and treatment policies would decrease the demand for illegal
drugs at the wholesale level by about 0.17%. Parameter φ, which captures the relative
eﬃciency of the drug producer country’s government on the war on drugs, is calibrated to
be about 0.61. Conversely, the resources spent by drug producers and traﬃckers on the war
o nd r u g sa r e1 . 6 2t i m e sm o r ee ﬃcient (1/0.61) than those resources invested by the drug
producer country’s government on the war on drugs.
Our estimate for ω implies that the U.S. has funded about 48.2% (1−ω)o ft h eC o l o m -
bian expenses on the war on drugs.
Finally, we calibrate the cost to the Colombian government of being labelled a narco-
state, c, to be about $3.8 billion, which is about 2% of current Colombian GDP. This
number lies within the range for this variable assumed in Grossman and Mejía (2008).
4. Concluding remarks
The model developed in this paper is a ﬁrst step towards understanding the interrelationship
between anti-drug policies in consumer and producer countries. Modelling the motivations
and choices of the actors involved in the war on drugs using economic tools (more precisely,
game theory tools) is an important step towards understanding the outcomes of this war.
This paper develops a simple model of the war on drugs in producer and consumer countries
in order to explain how resources are allocated by the diﬀerent actors involved in it, the
equilibrium outcomes, and the response of these outcomes to exogenous changes in some
of the key parameters of the model. Importantly, we explicitly model illegal drug markets,
which allows us to account for the feedback eﬀects between policy changes, prices, and the
strategic responses of the diﬀerent actors involved that are likely to arise as a result of large
scale policy interventions such as Plan Colombia.
We use the available data on the cocaine market at the wholesale level in consumer
c o u n t r i e sa sw e l la so u t c o m e sf r o mt h ew a ro nd r u g su n d e rPlan Colombia to calibrate the
unobservable parameters of the model. In particular, according to the calibration results,
the price elasticity of the demand for cocaine at the wholesale level in consumer countries is
about 0.66, which conﬁrms the view that the demand for drugs is inelastic. Additionally, we
estimate that a 1% increase in the resources invested in prevention and treatment policies
in the U.S. would decrease the demand for cocaine at the wholesale level by about 17%.
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